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This work attempts to understand why the work of Augustine 
of Hippo has experienced such a widespread revival in 
postmodernity, especially in the writings of Jacques Derrida. At 
first glance, an alliance between a postmodern atheist and a fourth 
century bishop and saint seems an unlikely one. However, it is not 
so strange if one considers that Augustine deals extensively with 
the problems of sin and guilt. The residue of his guilt survives 
even the grace of his conversion. The connection between Augus-
tine and the postmoderns is, perhaps, found in the common experi-
ence of guilt. The postmoderns are plagued by guilt without the 
consolation of absolution: guilt for the excesses of modernity, guilt 
for the rape of the environment, guilt for the holocaust, guilt for 
surviving when so many others did not. This work contends that 
Augustine's thought and Derrida's thought are, both, enriched by 
this odd, but fruitful, play of interpretations. This chapter attempts 
to situate Augustine in a postmodern context. It will focus prima-
rily on Augustine's text but read that text from a postmodern per-
spective. 
Augustine has experienced many revivals in the history of the 
West. But perhaps none so surprising as the current engagement 
with postmodernity. Moreover: "Augustine has played an inter-
esting role in postmodernism. Not only does he appear in Derrida's 
Circumfession and Memoirs of the Blind, but Lyotard, too, was 
working on the Confessions at the time of his death, and Heidegger's 
early lectures on St. Augustine have just been published in the 
Gesamtausgabe."* It will perhaps be through the revival of the 
Augustinian tradition of the restless heart that Catholicism will be 
able to engage in a real dialogue with postmodernity. 
Augustine's thought is resurrected and relevant again. The 
thinker at the birth of the medieval experiment is recalled to the 
center of discourse, albeit after a 1500 year hiatus. Nevertheless, 
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1500 years of dust cover little rust. How to think thoughtfully? It 
would appear the answer is—along with Augustine-in tears, by a 
deep humility, with an awareness of the sheer phenomenality of 
the terms of thought, with a sigh and a groan, with a confession, a 
confession of sin, guilt, finitude and how terribly thoughtless our 
thought tends to be. 
How might a postmodern thinker approach the central prob-
lem of language? Perhaps in manner similar to that of Augustine. 
Augustine's Confessions takes up the problem of language from 
the very beginning: "What has anyone achieved in words when he 
speaks about you? Yet woe to those who are silent about you 
because, though loquacious with verbosity, they have nothing to 
say."2 Augustine broaches the strange possibility of an impossible 
speaking. On the one hand, speaking can do no good (quid dicit 
aliquis, cum de te dicit?). On the other hand, it is the greatest of all 
tragedies if we dare not to speak (et vae tacentibus de te, quoniam 
loquaces muti sunt). We are impaled, mute and blabbering, on the 
horns of a dilemma. If we speak, we are foolish. If we dare not to 
speak, woe to us. As Derrida holds, "something becomes possible 
as impossible."3 
For Augustine, God, the fullness of presence, is never fully 
present. Language flounders in the dark and fecund depths of this 
aporia. Yet, this floundering is the precise condition of the possi-
bility of speech. If not Augustine then, perhaps, no other writer in 
the history of the West has had so great an awareness of the paucity 
of the written word. "Written" is an important qualifier. Of course, 
Socrates and, perhaps, Jesus Christ himself, recognized the infe-
rior status of thought and language in comparison to truth. How-
ever, neither Socrates nor Jesus was a writer. It is extraordinary 
that Augustine rivals their caution, while all the while writing. 
Writers, for their part, tend to idolize their words. Augustine, for 
all of the glittering beauty of his words, ever resists idolatry in all 
its forms, logolatry and verbolatry in particular. The admonition 
of Genesis could use a bit of clarifying: "You shall have no strange 
gods before me, and remember, all gods are strange." 
Augustine is clear as to his inability to name the ineffable, is 
clear as to how deeply strange his relationship with his God is. In 
one of the most poignant passages of his Confessions, he writes, 
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"What am I to you, Lord, that you should command me to love 
you, and that, if I fail to love you, you are angry with me and threaten 
me with vast miseries? If I do not love you, is that but a little 
misery...Speak to me so that I may hear. See the ears of my heart 
are open before you, Lord. Open them and say to my soul, 'I am 
your salvation.' After that utterance I will run and lay hold on you. 
Do not hide your face from me, lest I die. Let me die so that I may 
see it."4 Herein, Augustine proposes a theory of language and 
hermeneutics of meaning which is not often employed in Western 
thought. He speaks of the "ears of his heart" (ecce aures cordis 
mei). This heart without repose (cor irrequietum) is the founda-
tion of Augustine's theology and spirituality. However, it is also at 
the center of his epistemology. As Gabriel Marcel commented in 
his attempt to understand disquiet in the thought of Augustine, "this 
heart is not separated from the thought which genuinely consti-
tutes man as such."5 Augustine would have no strange gods be-
fore God, not even a god of his own invention, not even an idol 
crafted in the subtle creativity of his own mind: You shall have no 
strange Gods before me, and remember, all gods are strange, espe-
cially the ones we dream up for ourselves. 
There is a complex theory of language, a highly sophisticated 
hermeneutic of meaning which runs through the whole of the Con-
fessions, indeed throughout the whole of Augustine's theology. 
However, it is within the context of the Confessions that this herme-
neutical tension is most evident. It is as though Augustine vacil-
lates between two extremes: I cannot speak; I must speak; I cannot 
speak; I must speak; and so on, in an infinite play of impossible 
speech. Speech is twisted and tortured so as to discover that which 
is beyond all discovery. Language presumes to present the 
unpresentable. Augustine specifies: "If anyone finds your simul-
taneity beyond his understanding, it is not for me to explain it. Let 
him be content to say 'What is this?' (Exod. 116: 15). So too let 
him rejoice and delight in finding you who are beyond all discov-
ery rather than failing to find you by supposing you to be discover-
able."6 
The word is not heard due to the fact that one supposes that 
one might actually, and exhaustively, hear it. Augustine sets forth 
an odd, yet immensely fruitful, puzzle of language. The very 
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meaning to be gained in speech is lost in the presumption of speak-
ing. Discovery is barred at the precise moment when discovery is 
presumed to be possible. The possible meaning is only possible as 
impossible. Further on, Augustine will ask: "Who understands his 
sins?"7 He might just as well have asked, who understands his 
words? Or, who understands the speech by which one asks: who 
understands...? 
The matter of central importance for Augustine clarifies itself 
with his implied criticism of Cicero, "whose language (but not his 
heart) almost everyone admires."8 The "but not his heart" phrase 
should follow the Latin, pectus non ita, and be relieved of paren-
theses. There is no less parenthetical phrase in all of Augustine's 
writings. Augustine, despite being one of the most gifted writers 
in the history of the West, perceives that a fluid style is useless if 
one has nothing to say. Moreover, the something of speech is not a 
matter of mental gymnastics, cleverness or wit. The something to 
say flows from the heart. Cicero does not lack talent, native intel-
ligence or a felicitous capacity for expression. Cicero lacks the 
contents of the heart. Cicero wrote/spoke beautifully, prettily con-
vincingly and, most of all, vapidly. 
The tender and exquisite conclusion to Book III presents an 
example of Monica speaking an impossible word. Monica goes to 
a bishop to ask him to debate with Augustine and turn him from 
the error of his ways. The bishop declines, claiming that August-
ine is unready for repentance. Monica, with the persistence and 
shamelessness of a mother, will not take no for an answer: "She 
pressed him with more begging and floods of tears, asking him to 
see me and debate with me. He was irritated and a little vexed and 
said: 'Go away from me: as you live, it cannot be that the son of so 
many tears should perish."^ Monica presses the bishop with beg-
ging and floods of tears—hardly a rational argument but an argu-
ment nonetheless. The bishop is not moved by her logical argu-
ments. Rather, the bishop is moved by her tears. Moreover, the 
bishop does not respond with a rational, or even psychological, 
argument. Instead, he offers an extraordinary confession of faith: 
"It cannot be that the son of so many tears should perish." These 
words are understood by Monica the way that one understands 
music-in an immediate mediation to her heart.10 It is impossible to 
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separate the content of what is being given in this heavenly pres-
ence from its manner of being given. Hence, "she had taken these 
words as if they had sounded from heaven."" 
Monica speaks and then receives a word in a new and subtle 
language, the language of the heart. She speaks, if such a thing is 
possible (or at least possible as impossible), a word of tears. Heaven 
replies, if such a thing is possibly impossible, with an inaudible 
word of comfort, not spoken (elicit) but sounded (sonuisset) from 
heaven. Monica hears a sounding and not a speaking. 
This sounding as opposed to speaking is of crucial importance. 
With the sounding, Monica grasps an ineffable meaning, a mean-
ing which cannot quite be distilled into words. It is a meaning which 
can be talked about and around but never directly addressed, never 
distilled. As Socrates said of the fear of death, "You must sing 
incantations over it every day until you charm the bogy away."12 
Again, it is the analogy of music which may shed some light upon 
this impossible speaking. In a certain sense, the entirety of the 
Confessions is a sung incantation. Augustine sings over his sins 
and, once charmed, his song gives rise to thought. 
Augustine is a son of many tears. Even in sin, he wandered, 
"being seduced and seducing, being deceived and deceiving, in a 
variety of desires."'3 The wetness of his tears and his mother's 
tears, certainly drench his confessional biography. Those tears, 
likewise, soak the substance of Augustine's thought in general. 
Clearly, it remains to be seen if Augustinian tears fall anywhere 
but in the Confessions. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this 
interpretation that City of God, De Trinitatae and The Teacher obey 
the hermeutical logic of tears instigated in the Confessions. 
Augustine's sins meander, "in a variety of desires." In a similar 
fashion, his thought meanders in desire, albeit a desire for the 
exstasis of the Divine otherness. 
The death of Augustine's unnamed friend in Chapter IV is a 
crucial hinge-moment in the development of the tearful logic of 
the Confessions. With this death, Augustine becomes a vast prob-
lem to himself, "I became a vast question to myself, and my soul 
interrogated itself (factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio, et 
interrogabum animam meam).14 I become a vast question to my-
self. No more philosophical words than these have ever been writ-
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ten. Nevertheless, what sort of question turns the subject into a 
vast question mark? The question of myself, and the questioning 
of myself, illuminates and obscures. Moreover, as is music, the 
question of the purely erotic (erotique pure), gives way to the ec-
stasy of belief. 
As for Augustine, the self-scrutinizing question mark of grief 
produced little in the way of theoretical or practical answers. Thus: 
"Only tears were sweet to me, and in my soul's delight, weeping 
had replaced my friend."15 Tears do not merely serve to console 
Augustine and their value far exceeds their psychologically purga-
tive effects. Rather, tears take the place of his friend (amico med) 
as the dearest delight of the soul (delictis animi met). The value of 
tears is not limited to the psychological or moral realms. Tears 
bear ontological weight and must be throughly investigated. 
The philosopher is obligated to determine the difference be-
tween the contents of that which is presented and the manner of 
being present, while all the while realizing that these two can never 
be completely separated. The manner of being present carries one 
into the region of the heart. Weeping, in a manner of speaking, 
recreates the world and broadens the possibility of what the world 
might mean for the weeper: "Man is a vast deep, whose hairs, Lord, 
you have numbered, and in you none can be lost. Yet, it is easier to 
count his hairs than the passions and emotions of his heart."16 The 
topography of the human heart is complex. The movements of the 
heart open a vast field of questions, aporias and hermeneutical ten-
sions. Nevertheless, no mystery is more mysterious than the soul 
awakening. The soul is a vast deep and is only explicable as inex-
plicable. 
For Augustine, clarity and precision are low-order virtues; they 
are important but only in reference to relatively unimportant mat-
ters. Certainly, clarity and precision shed little light on the soul. 
For example, Aristotle's book on the categories impressed Augus-
tine as being "an extremely clear statement about substances."17 
This clarity gave birth to a deeper and darker confusion: "What 
help was it to me when this book was also an obstacle? Thinking 
that absolutely everything that exists is comprehended under the 
ten categories, I tried to conceive you also, my God, wonderfully 
simple and immutable, as if you too were a subject of which beauty 
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and magnitude are attributes."18 The clarity of the Categories ob-
viates its original purpose. In the end, the book is not a light to 
illumine the way but an obstacle in the path. To employ a distinc-
tively Augustinian analogy, this ultra-clear rationality turns upon 
itself like a dog upon its master ("et latrare adversum /e"), 1 9 liter-
ally that is, I "barked" against Thee. 
The start of Book V hints at an interesting possibility. Augus-
tine writes: "Your entire creation never ceases to praise you and is 
never silent. Every spirit continually praises you with mouth turned 
towards you; animals and physical matter find a voice through those 
who contemplate you. So from weariness our soul rises towards 
you, first supporting itself on the created order and then passing on 
to you yourself who wonderfully made it."20 There are two crucial 
matters at stake in this brief quote. As usual, Augustine, a pro-
found interpreter of texts, needs careful interpretation. 
First, he claims that, "animals and physical matter find a voice." 
How could animals, much less physical matter, find a voice? What 
speaking is spoken by animals, brutish by definition? Moreover, 
how might it be possible that inanimate and opaque matter finds a 
voice? Doubtless, such a dual miracle is mediated through "those 
who contemplate them." Nevertheless, we who speak are able to 
give voice to the mute and make sense of the prosaic meaningless-
ness of the pure given. The human being speaks, and impossibly 
speaks, for the less than human. Hence, the human is revealed as 
more than human. Augustine dreams the dream of the unspeak-
able, the ineffable, the impossible. He does so by the tortured logic 
of confession. He speaks for the less human by the same illogical 
logic whereby he speaks of his sin, his guilt and his tears. 
Second, "the weariness of our soul rises toward you." The 
inability to speak is a manner of speaking. Obviously, one must 
take care not to attribute too through-going a Platonism to Augus-
tine. Still more absurd would be to claim that Augustine is, tout 
simple, a neo-Platonist after the fashion of Plotinus, insofar as, the 
created order passes over to the Creator. The physical order can-
not explain itself by immanent causality. Instead, the metaphysi-
cal order makes sense of the physical order. This is, doubtless, 
true for Augustine. However, it would seem that postmodemity 
undertakes a similar tack in its critique of modernity. 
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It is not style, this or that manner of speaking, which deter-
mines truth: "Wisdom and foolishness are like food that is nour-
ishing or useless. Whether the words are ornate or not does not 
decide the issue."21 Faustus, who so greatly disappoints Augustine's 
high hopes, is not utterly disappointing. At the least, he is not one 
of "those many loquacious people," whom Augustine had to en-
dure, who attempted to teach him while having nothing to say. 
Yet, the difference between Faustus and these unnamed prattlers 
has nothing to do with erudition, wit or method. Instead, Faustus 
is better, if only slightly better, because: "He had a heart which, if 
not right towards you, was at least very cautious with himself."22 
Truth is fashioned in the heart. 
Here, the alliance with postmodernity is evident: "Picking up 
a phrase from Saint Augustine, Derrida says that truth in 
deconstruction has to do with doing or making truth (facere 
veritatem), making truth happen, effecting it, forming and forging 
truth."23 Reality is not deconstructed in deconstruction. Rather, 
the fable world of constructed method is deconstructed so as to 
allow the undeconstructible to impossibly present itself. However, 
this undeconstructible is not utterly obscure, even if it is not pre-
cisely on the order of scientific or rational knowledge. The trace 
of meaning in Augustine's tears is "heterogeneous to the 
formalizable order of knowledge."24 
It is always shocking to realize that Augustine lived in the fourth 
and fifth, and not the seventeenth, century. There are passages 
which one could well imagine to have come from Descartes: "I 
wanted to be as certain about things I could not see as I am certain 
that seven and three are ten."25 In a sense, Augustine is already 
postmodern before the outbreak of modernity. He confronts the 
problem of certainty in knowledge and moves toward faith rather 
than criticism. Hence, if not actually postmodern, he is at least 
post critical. He does not go around, but through, the critical ques-
tion. 
Once confronted with the problem of certitude, Augustine un-
dergoes a gradual conversion, which is as much epistemological 
as it spiritual: 
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Then, little by little, Lord, with a gentle and mer-
ciful hand you touched and calmed my heart. I 
considered the innumerable things I believed 
which I had not seen, events which occurred when 
I was not present, such as many incidents in the 
history of nations, many facts concerning places 
and cities which I have never seen, many things 
accepted on the word of friends, many from phy-
sicians, many from other people. Unless we be-
lieved what we were told, we would do nothing at 
all in this life. Finally, I realized how unmoveably 
sure I was about the identity of my parents from 
whom I came, which I could not know unless I 
believed what I heard.26 
It dawns on Augustine that even the simplest and most self-evident 
data of ordinary knowledge would be rendered inaccessible if forced 
to live up to the rigid and impossible criteria of certainty. The 
difference between Augustine and his modern counterparts is that 
he deems it counter-intuitive and absurd to conclude that "I cannot 
know if the sun will rise tomorrow." Belief, therefore, is not set 
against knowledge. To the contrary, belief is the precise condition 
of the possibility of knowledge. The fault lays not with belief but 
with unbelief, in that, unbelief cannot even sustain itself in a mean-
ingful way. The unbeliever, should he be radical and constant in 
his unbelief is, at best, reduced to silence. At worst, the unbeliever 
subverts his own truths in a circular movement of epistemic sui-
cide. 
The quest for certitude is ultimately self-defeating on many 
levels, the most evident of which is the psychological level. Certi-
tude is a brand of intellectual neurosis. The lust for certitude must 
be set aside so that the mind can engage in the free play which is 
constitutive of thought itself. Extreme anxiety, even anxiety as to 
the justifications of thinking, petrifies thought. Truth is something 
like a relaxation, a fluidity of human faculties in a perpetual play: 
"When are we to recreate ourselves and unbend our minds, allow-
ing the mind to relax from the tensions of anxieties?"27 
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The progress of uneasiness and anxiety resolving themselves 
in faith is manifest in Augustine. Gabriel Marcel makes the claim, 
"joy whatever one might think of it, does not exclude uneasiness 
such as we have seen it in particular define itself for St. August-
ine."2 8 Uneasiness is the aspiration of the minus being (moins-
etre) for the plus being (plus-etre). Augustine's thirst is ultimately 
quenched. However, one must take care not to travel too quickly 
through these middle Books of the Confessions, since one cannot 
appreciate the quenching unless one feels the thirst. Indeed, philo-
sophical interpretations of The Confessions tend to jump immedi-
ately to books ten and eleven, on memory and time respectively. 
While one could argue that from a philosophical perspective these 
are crucial books, one might also argue that they are incomprehen-
sible without the nine books of searching which precede them. 
Augustine repeatedly shows himself to be unafraid of the open-
ness of aporias. In Book VII, he writes: "I was seeking the origin 
of evil and there was no solution."29 Even while Augustine's intel-
lect wallows in a quagmire of vanity and presumption, his heart 
was turning rightly toward truth: "As in silence I vigorously pur-
sued my quest, inarticulate sufferings of my heart [soul] were loudly 
pleading for your mercy."30 God's mercy must not be interpreted 
too narrowly. Truth is no less of a mercy than justice or compas-
sion. 
There is a side issue which must be addressed. The Confes-
sions are not addressed to the reader. They are addressed to God. 
In a certain sense, the reader of Augustine engages in an act of 
spiritual voyeurism. Peter Brown states it perfectly: "Augustine's 
back is turned to us throughout the Confessions. His attention is 
elsewhere. He is speaking with his God. The pronoun tu - "Thou," 
"You"-occurs in 381 of the 453 paragraphs of the Confessions,,"31 
Yet Augustine writes: "And now I confess to you, O Lord, in writ-
ing (Et nunc confiteor tibi, domine, in litteris)."*2 The question 
must arise: for whom is Augustine writing? Surely not for God, 
who knows the secrets of Augustine's heart better than Augustine 
himself knows them. 
Augustine's writing has a metaphysical and transcendent func-
tion. Which is to say, he writes to express the inexpressible in rags 
of sick expression. Writing presents the unpresentable: "When I 
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write there is nothing other than what I write. Whatever else I felt 
I have not been able to say, and whatever else has escaped me are 
ideas or a stolen verb which I will destroy, to replace them with 
something else." 3 3 The writing is not for God. The writing is for 
Augustine himself that he might dredge forth from darkness the 
secrets of his soul. 
Writing, especially Augustine's writing, combines monstrous 
pride with saintly humility. He writes to say what cannot be said. 
So, why write? Because it cannot be said. But if it cannot be said, 
why write? Do we not thus risk idolatry? Not if one knows that it 
cannot be said. The speakable reveals itself as unspeakable. There-
fore, "whatever way you turn, you have not even started think-
ing."34 The act of confession never quite rises to the level of thought; 
confession is simultaneously demure and audacious—but never so 
audacious as thought itself: "Readers can feel they have stumbled, 
unawares, on the most intimate of scenes-a human being (them-
selves as much as Augustine) brought with joy and trembling into 
the presence of God, their judge and their friend."35 This is a way 
of speaking, though perhaps not a way of thinking critically, about 
God. 
Finally, the question of certainty resolves itself for Augustine, 
albeit in a rather non-traditional manner: "You have mercy on dust 
and ashes, and it has pleased you to restore my deformities in your 
sight. By inward goads your stirred me to make me find it unen-
durable until, through my inward perception, you were a certainty 
to me." 3 6 Some qualifications need to be made with regard to the 
translation of "through my inward perception, you were a certainty 
to me." As seen above, this translation, emphasizing certainty as it 
does, is perhaps too simple and does not capture the subtlety of the 
Latin text. Augustine's text reads: "donee mihi per interiorem 
aspectus certus esses" A more literal translation would read: "un-
til such time as it might be assured to my inward sight, that it was 
thou thyself." In spite of the awkwardness of the English prose, 
the literal sense must be retained. It is not certainty which is at 
stake but an "assurance unto my inward sight." Augustine, as 
mentioned above, is not seeking the sort of clarity from the invis-
ible things that he seeks from the visible things; such clarity is 
illusory in any event. Augustine seeks, instead, to rest on a deeper 
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assurance, an assurance rooted in his relationship to the God who 
is beyond all understanding. This God could never be a certainty 
in the sense of being as certain to the intellect as the fact that 7+3= 10. 
God is not produced, deduced or found at the end of a syllogism. 
Rather God is the conceptual framework that makes all syllogisms, 
propositions and deductions possible. In short God is not a truth 
but the conceptual basis of all possible truth. 
The start of Book VIII presents the most unpresentable pas-
sage of the Confessions: "My desire was not to be more certain of 
you but to be more stable in you."" Epistemologically, Augustine 
gives us a prayer of, and for, truth. Truth is not a thing of which I 
am certain. Truth is that non-thing of which / am. I am not, ever 
or truly, certain of truth. I am, if such state of being is possible, 
assured in truth. The desire for truth is as much desired as it is 
acquired. Truth has every bit as much to do with what / am as with 
what / have. I stand before truth. I stand within truth. I am be-
cause there is truth and can speak of truth because I am. 
It is necessary to interject a note of caution into these reflec-
tions, lest one attempt a wildly anachronistic work, something like 
Augustine as a postmodern Writer. Augustine is not a postmodern 
writer. However, the apophatic elements of his theology are con-
sequential for postmodern thought: "Thus while it would be comi-
cal to find a negative theology in deconstruction, it would not be 
surprising to find deconstruction in negative theology-as a prac-
tice, as a strategy, as a way negative theologians have found to 
hold the claims of cataphatic theology at bay."38 
Truth, so contends Augustine, is more a matter of stability in 
than certainty about. This contention holds true throughout the 
Confessions. Moreover, the notion of truth as an assurance per-
vades the whole of Augustine's theology. Truth is not something 
grasped, something comprehended. Instead, truth grasps and com-
prehends us. As Augustine wrote in the Contra Faustus, "to know 
the truth we must live in the truth." Why? Simply put, because the 
truth is bigger than we are. We dwell in truth. The truth does not 
dwell in us. 
There is a Zen story of four pygmies who went off into the 
dark jungle to seek the elephant God. In the darkest night, they 
find the elephant but it is so pitch black that they cannot see. They 
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each touch the god in the darkness. Upon returning to their vil-
lage, they are asked what the god was like. The first says, "he is 
like a wall." He touched the side of the elephant. The second says, 
"he is like a hose." He touched the nose of the elephant, The third 
said, "he is like a rope." He touched the tail. The fourth said, "he 
is like a tree." He grabbed he leg. The story ends with the ques-
tion: which of the pygmies was right? Of course, they are all right 
insofar as they are able to grasp this thing that is so much bigger 
than themselves. This story, aside from its theological and ecu-
menical value, has epistemological implications. Truth is not some-
thing we produce. Instead, in a certain manner of speaking, we are 
productions of truth. Truth haloes us and prods us to attain a deeper 
ontological depth. By living in the truth, one's horizon is expanded 
and made more fecund. We grow in the truth; the truth does not 
grow in us. Like pygmies blindly grappling with the elephant god, 
we never exhaust, or even fully grasp, the object of our knowing. 
Therefore, the art of knowing is a perpetual and fully human 
struggle to dwell in truth. The rational or logical mode is only one 
way, among many ways, of knowing. Further, rationality griev-
ously errs if it seeks to establish itself as the only mode of know-
ing. Rational discourse finds its impetus in a non-rational founda-
tion and ultimately falls back exhausted on that foundation: "The 
arguments were exhausted and had all been refuted. The only thing 
left was a mute trembling, and, as if it were facing death it was 
terrified of being restrained from the treadmill of habit by which it 
suffered 'sickness unto death.'"39 This mute trembling does not 
end in death. Instead, it gives way to the actual moment of conver-
sion for Augustine. Trembling gives way to barely tempered truth. 
With Alypius in the garden at Milan, Augustine finally gives in to 
the ineluctable pull of conversion. Augustine goes off by himself 
and within him is, "precipitated a vast storm bearing a massive 
downpour of tears...I threw myself down somehow on a certain 
figtree, and let my tears flow freely. Rivers streamed from my 
eyes." 4 0 The all-important hinge moment of conversion is accom-
plished not with an argument or a syllogism, but by a dissolution 
into tears. Moreover, reminiscent of Monica's hearing a wordless 
message sounded from heaven, Augustine suddenly hears "a voice 
from a nearby house, chanting as if it might be a boy or a girl (I 
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don't know which)."41 The fact that the conversion is accomplished 
is testified to by Augustine. Yet, the conversion is accomplished 
with groans, sighs and tears. Augustine has remade the world 
through weeping. The warm, wet intimacy of his tears has accom-
plished what Cicero, Aristotle, Neo-Platonism and Manicheaism 
could not. Augustine has finally found the key to his heart, the 
secret and occult meaning of his desires. In a sense, the first para-
graph of the Confessions is revealed in its true and fullest sense: 
"You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have 
made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you." 4 2 
Truth is not, can never be, a cold and detached truth. Augustine, 
could be read as an anticipatory corrective to Modernity. We are 
not detached spectators and reason cannot purify itself to such a 
degree that it accepts nothing as true except that which appears as 
clear and distinct to the mind. Perspective is not rarified and de-
tached. Rather, perspective, as always, is already full.4 3 
Book Ten is, in many ways, the highwater mark of the Confes-
sions. The truth is explicitly bound together with Augustine's re-
membering and sighs and tears: "As to the other pleasures of life, 
regret at their loss should be in inverse proportion to the extent to 
which one weeps for them. The less we weep for them, the more 
we ought to be weeping."44 Augustine being so deeply literary 
and yet cautious as to the adequacy of the written word, stands as 
the first great remedy to the problem of Western logocentricism. 
Augustine writes, and tears drown his writing in a seemingly 
endless play of impossible speech: "This I desire to do, in my heart 
before you in confession, and before many witnesses with my 
pen."45 Here is a fascinating play of language and thought. The 
aim of Augustine's writing is to lay bear his heart in confessions. 
However, he will do this "with his pen before many witnesses." 
Hence, "What could be hidden within me, even if I were unwilling 
to confess it to you? I would be hiding you from myself, not my-
self from you. Now, however, my groaning is witness that I am 
displeased with myself."46 Augustine writes and does not write: 
"Therefore my God, my confession is made both in silence and not 
in silence. It is silent in that there is not audible sound; but in love 
it cries aloud."47 Again, the eternal play of impossible significa-
tions arises: silent and not silent, spoken and unspoken, present 
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and absent. Augustine's writing is a signifier of the signifier which, 
"conceals and erases itself in its own production."48 
A disclaimer or a warning is offered the reader of The Confes-
sions: "I also, Lord, so make my confessions to you that I may be 
heard by people to whom I cannot prove that my confession is 
true. But those whose ears are opened by love believe me." 4 9 It is 
not proof which is at issue but assurance. As with all matters of 
great subtlety or depth, certainty is no ontological guarantee. Truth 
is stirred up in the soul by love. To know truth, one must love 
truth. 
This notion, as to the "loveableness" of truth, becomes much 
more clear when one considers Augustine's approach to the ulti-
mate truth: "Yet there is a light I love, and a food, and a kind of 
embrace when I love my God-a light, voice, odor, food, embrace 
of my inner man, where my soul is floodlit by light which space 
cannot contain, where there is sound that time cannot seize, where 
there is perfume which no breeze disperses, where there is a taste 
for food that no amount of eating can lessen, and where there is a 
bond of union that no satiety can part. That is what I love when I 
love my God."5 0 Augustine speaks of a longing that is unbroken 
by satiety, a desire for that which is unpresentable, ungraspable 
and ineffable. No signifier is able to establish a reference to a 
signified. Yet, for all that, the signifier continuously attempts to 
refer to that which is beyond all reference; the attempt to speak the 
unspeakable establishes itself at the root of all language. 
What miraculous and trespassing sign is able to effect the pro-
cess of inner embrace of which Augustine speaks? One would 
need to find some way to understand what is meant by a "light that 
space cannot contain and a sound that time cannot seize." How-
ever such a grasping must be possible insofar as, "human beings 
can put a question to the invisible things of God."51 
Memory is the key term here in Book Ten. It unlocks all mys-
teries, for all is contained in the vast treasure house of memory. 
Yet, what is remembered is remembered at a level more founda-
tional than the merely verbal level. Logos, for all of its exagger-
ated priority of place thus far in the Western tradition, is given its 
first disciplinary session here in Augustine: "With my tongue si-
lent and my throat making no sound, I can sing what I wish." 5 2 
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There is no limit to the power of memory in Augustine. It is vast 
and infinitely profound. The hegemony of logos is here re-ordered 
and disciplined in Augustine's epistemology. 
Actually, the source of logos' discoursivity is to be found in 
the brooding, silent, wordless presence of memory. The mind's 
encounter with the treasure store of memory is not creative on the 
part of the mind. The mind does not produce what it thinks. In-
stead: "By thinking we, as it were, gather together ideas which the 
memory contains in a dispersed and disordered way, and by con-
centrating our attention we arrange them in order as if ready to 
hand, stored in the very memory where previously they lay hid-
den, scattered, and neglected."53 Hence, the mind is not produc-
tive, much less purely creative. The mind serves a purely regula-
tive and ancillary function, and thought is in the service of memory. 
The contents of thought need to be gathered (cogenda) so as to 
be known. They are collected from a dispersed state: "It is what is 
collected (that is, by force) in the mind, not elsewhere, which is 
strictly speaking the object of recollection."54 The mind gathers by 
force, by a violence. Further, this violent gathering passes over 
much of what it would gather up: "Metaphysical illusion consists 
in treating a presentation like a situation...A presentation does not 
present a universe to someone; it is the event of its (inapprehensible) 
presence."55 Augustine is no less aware of the danger of meta-
physical illusion than is Kant. In fact, Augustine's fear of infidel-
ity would render him even more loathe to transgress Divine mys-
tery than Kant is loathe to allow the faculties to transgress one 
another's domain. For Kant, metaphysical illusion is only a mis-
take. For Augustine, metaphysical illusion would be idolatry. 
The alliance of thought with idolatry is a subtle and ever-shift-
ing one. Thought tends toward idolatry as a final and mortal temp-
tation. There is a natural tendency to close off the aporia and so to 
strangle thought. Augustine the thinker resists this temptation with 
the shield of confession: "I at least, Lord, have difficulty at this 
point, and I find my own self hard to grasp. I have become for 
myself a soil which is a cause of difficulty and much sweat."5 6 The 
exploration of the soul is a cause of much sweat and toil. More-
over, the image of the soil is not chosen capriciously. The soil is 
never all tilled. The soil is perpetually tilled anew. One can see a 
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connection to the aforementioned slogan of Derrida: "To think is 
tore-think." One is never quite done with thinking. In fact, if one 
claims to be done, we can be sure of one thing at least, that one is 
no longer thinking. 
The passage on forgetfulness is also relevant: "But what is 
nearer to me than myself? Indeed the power of my memory is 
something I do not understand when without it I cannot speak about 
myself. What shall I say when it is certain to me that I remember 
forgetfulness?"57 Augustine takes great delight in playing with 
many paradoxes which constitute thinking and speaking, if not 
thought and language. We remember forgetfulness. With memory, 
as later with time, Augustine knows what memory and time are 
until he is asked to explain. Then, he is unable to tell us. He 
knows and he does not know. Or, he knows until he reflects on it 
and then he no longer knows-an impossible speaking being spo-
ken nonetheless: 
What is time? Who can explain this easily and 
briefly? Who can comprehend this even in thought 
so as to articulate the answer in words? Yet what 
do we speak of, in our familiar everyday conver-
sation, more than of time? We surely know what 
we mean when we speak of it. We also know what 
is meant when we hear someone else talking about 
it. What then is time? Provided that no one asks 
me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I 
do not know.5 8 
Augustine shows time and memory to be mysteries in the deep-
est sense of the word. He tells us that we cannot know them; then, 
he proceeds to spend the two longest and most difficult chapters of 
The Confessions writing about them, writing precisely about things 
of which he does not know. However, it is a speaking that remains 
always a speaking and never attains the level of speech. As Marcel 
would say, the mode of speaking in not so much a thought that is 
all thought out (pensee pensee) as it is a thinking thought {pensee 
pensante). This distinction corresponds roughly to what Bergson 
has termed an opened {pensee pensante), as opposed to a closed ( 
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(pensee pensee)) manner of thinking. Augustine, first closes off 
the possibility of meaningful speech about God, then relentlessly 
and impossibly speaks. Augustine opens aporias and is comfort-
able with letting them remain open. Augustine is thinker who is 
quickly bored with problems and fascinated by mysteries, the mys-
tery of himself and his world no less than the mystery of his God. 
Ultimately, the object of thought is literally unthinkable. Even 
memory does not contain it, though the power of memory is pre-
cious and vast: "I will transcend even this my power which is called 
memory, so great is the force of life in a human being whose life is 
mortal. What then ought I to do, my God? You are my true life. I 
will transcend even this my power which is called memory. I will 
rise beyond it to move towards you who are constant above me." 5 9 
Thought passes beyond the thinkable to what is constant above it. 
Thought, at the limit of its purview, dissolves, or passes, into reas-
surance (secura suavitas). 
Toward the end of Book X, Augustine makes a startling and 
unimaginable demand. He writes: "See my condition! Weep with 
me and weep for me, you who have within yourself a concern for 
the good, the springs from which good action proceed."60 So far, 
nothing too strange, merely a somewhat rhetorical flourish that 
begs the reader's sympathy. Then the other shoe drops: "You, Lord 
my God, hear, look and see and have mercy on me and heal me. In 
your eyes I have become a problem to myself, and that is my sick-
ness."61 Recalling that the addressee of the Confessions is not the 
reader but God, Augustine is beseeching his God "to weep with 
him and for him." Augustine betrays a deep passion for the impos-
sible. It is an impossibility that has its roots in the mystery of the 
human soul—I have become a problem to myself. Moreover, the 
impossibility stretches out to the border of the infinite—I invoke 
God, who has no eyes with which to weep, to weep for and with 
the dust he has made. 
Kierkegaard, writing under the name of Johannes de Silentio, 
claimed, "everyone became great in proportion to his expectancy. 
One became great by expecting the possible, another by expecting 
the eternal; but he who expected the impossible became the great-
est of all."62 It is clear that Augustine's passion for the impossible 
and the absolute carries him into the realm of the great. Derrida, in 
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his fascinating study of his own/Augustine's religion entitled 
Circumfession, legislates: "Only write what is impossible, that ought 
to be the impossible rule."63 
Augustine situates his thought, his life and his confession be-
fore the Absolute, the selfsame, the Infinite and the Unspeakable. 
It is a passion, as Derrida holds, which is not alien to transgression. 
The bounds of the possible are continually transgressed, "which is 
what Derrida calls, following Blanchot, the passion of the pas, the 
pas of passion. What we have not understood is that deconstruction 
stirs with a passion for the impossible, passion de lieu, a passion 
for an impossible place, a passion to go precisely where you can-
not go." 6 4 
Now, the original questions should be readily answerable: what 
is the precise locus of Augustine's thought in postmodernity? Why 
are basically non-religious postmodern thinkers, such as Lyotard 
and Derrida, taking such an interest in Augustine, and especially in 
the Confessions! Clearly, the postmoderns have a passion for the 
impossible, for the unpresentable and for the silent margins of 
thought. Which idea is more impossible, more unpresentable, more 
unspeakable, more liable to be victimized by idolatry than the Au-
gustinian idea of God? In fact, to even name God "an idea" is to 
fall under the sway of an implicit idolatry. Nothing is more un-
nameable than God. Yet, the act of naming the Divine is the core 
of what constitutes the human: I cannot speak; I must speak; 1 can-
not speak; I must speak; and so on in an endless chain of reversals 
which constitute thought itself. 
Finally, Augustine asks a question, a question that admits of 
no positive answer, "when shall I be capable of proclaiming by 
'the tongue of my pen' all your exhortations and all your terrors 
and consolations and directives...? And if I have the capacity to 
proclaim this in an ordered narrative, yet the drops of time are too 
precious to me."6 5 The answer to this question constitutes a per-
petual deferral in the thought of Augustine. When will he exhaust 
the mystery of God? Clearly, never! Nevertheless, "the drops of 
time are precious to him." The question, the search for an answer 
which is perpetually unattainable, this questioning is itself precious 
and sacred. It is as though Augustine defers with a nearly 
Derridadean gesture. When? Not yet. When? Not yet. When? He 
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told us at the beginning. Our hearts were made for Yourself, O 
Lord, and they are restless-they will ever be restless-until they 
rest in You. Until that moment, the answer will always and ever 
be: "Not Yet!" 
The postmoderns are fascinated with Augustine. Subsequent 
chapters will attempt to sort out why this is true for several par-
ticular thinkers. As a provisional answer, it seems that they are 
deeply interested in the Augustinian self, the confessing soul. The 
uncanny and mystical aspect of Augustine's thought is expressed 
in a deluge of tears, sighs and physical groans. The postmoderns 
are interested in a mode of thinking that does not fly away in ab-
straction but holds itself to account for the incarnation and em-
bodiment. The quote from Gustave Thibon with which Gabriel 
Marcel ended a lecture at the Institut Superieur de Pedagogie at 
Lyons on December 13th, 1942 serves well as a bridge from Au-
gustine to postmodernity: 
You feel hedged in; you dream of escape; but be-
ware of mirages. Do not run or fly away in order 
to get free: rather dig in the narrow place which 
has been given you; you will find God there and 
everything. God does not float on your horizon, 
he sleeps in your substance. Vanity runs, love digs. 
If you fly away from yourself, your prison will 
run with you and you will close in because of the 
wind of your flight; if you go down deep into your-
self all will disappear in paradise.66 
The Bishop of Hippo is as loathe as any postmodern to fly away in 
abstraction. The most persistent of all modern mirages is the empty 
and transcendental self. God does not float on the horizon, like 
some lovely metaphysical sunset, to be admired from afar. God 
sleeps in our substance. These words could be a direct on 
Augustine's Confessions. No thinker in the history of the West has 
been less other-worldly than Augustine, less prone to arid meta-
physical speculation and disembodied abstraction. Little wonder 
that the postmoderns, who revolt against the angelism of moder-
nity, would find an ally in Augustine. 
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